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In his article "Animal Rights," [lJ Jan 
Narveson presents an alternative "rroral" 
theory to what he calls the "Singer-Regan 
position." This theory--"rational egoism"-­
\\Quld exclude non-human animals from rroral 
consideration and deny them all rights. His 
excuse for developing this "nasty doctrine" 
is that he is "not convinced that they [Sing­
er and Regan] are right" and that "there is 
much to be learned from doing so." Regan 
replies to this argument in his article "Nar­
veson on Egoism and the Rights of Ani­
rrals, "[ 2] and now Dale Jamieson has entered 
the debate with his "Rational Egoism and 
Animal Rights," [3] a critique both of Narve­
son's position and of Regan's rebuttal. 
Neither of these rejoinders to Narve­
son's argument is very effective. Both ig­
nore its principal weakness and are thorough­
ly speciesist, leaving open the possibility 
of justifying the continued abuse of anirrals. 
In the present paper, [4] I try to explicate 
the principal flaw in Narveson's position 
(section one), show the inadequacy of Regan's 
and Jamieson's replies (section t\\Q) , and 
suggest the basis for a rrore cogent critique 
of "rational egoism" (section three). In the 
final section of the paper, I argue that 
analysis of these articles reveals the danger 
of enervation faced by any liberation move­
ment when its issues becxxne the focus of 
debate within an academic context. 
i 
Narveson's argument. is briefly as fol­
lows: the foundation of rrorality is not, as 
Singer and Regan \\Quld have it, the recog­
nition that all anirrals have the right to 
equal treatment in cases in which they would. 
suffer evil as a result of being denied it. 
On the contrary, rights are based solely upon 
mutual agreement between "rational" agents 
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with a view toward reciprocal maximization of 
egoistic self-interest. Since non-human ani­
mals can neither assert self-interested 
claims as "rights" nor force from human 
beings the recognition of them by virtue of 
the power to infringe on corresponding human 
"rights," non-human animals have no rights. 
We human beings are, therefore, ''norally'' 
entitled to abuse animals in any way we see 
fit so long as such treatment does not in­
fringe on our own self-interest (as it might, 
for example, if we beat an expensive riding 
horse to death). 
Narveson proceeds to consider the case 
of rrorons and children as the basis of a 
possible objection to his theory. Children 
who are very young \\Quld seem to lack the 
capacity to assert self-interested claims, 
and alrrost all of them certainly lack the 
coercive power to get these claims recognized 
as "rights." Similarly, depending on their 
degree of debilitation, rrorons cannot assert 
claims, and though many may have the coercive 
power to infringe on others' "rights," they 
are not likely to realize that the guarantee 
of the recognition of their own claims as 
"rights" depends on not infringing on others' 
corresponding "rights." A "rational" egoist 
will, thus, have no "rational" basis for 
respecting the "rights" of rrorons, since the 
rrorons will probably not respect him/her• 
Narveson's implicit conclusion, therefore, is 
that children and rrorons, like non-human 
animals, have no rights. But is this a tell­
ing objection to the theory of rational ego­
ism? Only if children's and rroron' s lack of 
rights in scme way results in the diminish­
ment of other rational egoists' self-inter­
ests. 
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Peculiarly enough, however, the objec­
tion to rational egoism as fonnulated above 
does not appear to be the objection which 
Narveson tries to counter in his article. He 
is not trying to prove that the denial of 
rights to children and rrorons does not reduce 
other rational egoists' self-interests. Ra­
ther, he seems to be trying to prove that 
such a denial of rights need not involve 
treatment of children and rrorons which is 
different fran that accorded to other hurcan 
beings who possess rights, and precisely for 
the reason that it is not in the self-inter­
est of rational egoists to treat them differ­
ently. That this is the true meaning of 
Narveson's response is evident fran the fact 
that he refers to this objection as "Singer's 
and Regan's argument fran marginal cases. " 
Singer's and Regan's point is not that deny­
ing children an.d rrorons rights will result in 
a diminution of rational egoists' self-inter­
ests, and is, therefore, inconsistent with 
their position, but that the denial of rights 
will lead to abuse of children and rrorons, 
which is rrorally wrong. But a rational ego­
ist who is consistent has no reason to share 
this concern. Mistreatment of children and 
rrorons can be of no moral concern to a ra­
tional egoist, unless it results in the re­
duction of his/her own self-interests. Such 
an objection, in fact, is ccmpletely irrele­
vant, for it is based on a moral premise­
that it is wrong deliberately to inflict 
evil--which the rational egoist explicitly 
rejects. 
It would seem, however, that Narveson is 
inconsistent in his reasoning. He seems to 
share Singer's and Regan's concern, as is 
indicated both by the fact that he attempts 
to refute the "arguments fran marginal cases" 
and by his rejection of cannibalism. Hte 
seems, at one and the same time, to want to 
deny that there is any moral ground for 
rights except egoistic self-interest, and yet 
to protect hurcan beings who possess no rights 
fran the abuse which might result fran such a 
denial. The only way in which he can do 
this, without exposing himself to the charge 
that he provides no justification for prefer­
ential treatment of hurcan beings without 
rights as canpared to non-hurcan animals, is 
to try to show that although children and 
morons, like non-hurcan animals, have no 
rights, it is, nonetheless, in the self­
interest of rational egoists to treat them 
equally. Narveson would say, of course, that 
it is not in their self-interest to treat 
non-hurcan animals equally. 
According to Narveson, a rational egoist 
will treat children ~ though they had 
rights, because the self-interests of ration­
ally egoistic parents include the self-inter­
ests of their children (rroronic or other­
wise). Since they want their own children 
protected, they will respect other people's 
children as well. Moreover, according to 
Narveson, a rational egoist has "nothing to 
gain from being permitted to invade the chil­
dren of others" (a highly questionable as­
sumption, as witness child migrant laborers). 
But what about orffums? Since these children 
have no parents, their abuse would not seem 
to diminish other rational egoists' self-
interests. Narveson has an answer which is 
applicable to this case, but it is very weak: 
we have an interest in the children 
of others being properly cared for 
because we don't want them growing 
up to be criminals or delinquents, 
etc. 
Prestnnably, this would apply not only to 
children with parents but to orphans as well. 
It is, however, based on a highly speculative 
possibility which is unlikely to be decisive 
in determining a rational egoist's calcula­
tions of self-interest at any given time. 
Moreover, it is obvious that not all forms of 
abuse lead to criminal tendencies. 
Narveson thinks a rational egoist will 
treat (adult) rrorons equally lest he not be 
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treated equally were he to beoome a !lOron. 
To this "rational" argument, Narveson appends 
two "non-rational" bases for equal treatment 
of (adult) !lOrons, which would prestmably 
also apply to children (!lOrons or otherwise). 
The first is that a moron's rational rela­
tives may have a "sentimental interest" in 
his beirig treated equally. I.t is unclear in 
what sense, if any, this "sentimental inter­
est" is a fonn of self-interest. M::>reover, 
as Regan points out in his reply, it seems 
obvious that such sentimental interest does 
not always exist. The other factor is "sen­
timent-generalization," the htnnan tendency to 
extend sympathy to members of one's own race, 
species, etc. it seems quite clear that this 
is not consistent with egoistic self-inter­
est. 
Both Regan and Jamieson reply to Narve­
son's argument by trying to show that it is 
not necessarily true that the self-interest 
of rational egoists will always guarantee 
that children and !lOrons, though lacking 
rights, will be treated equally. Regan li­
mits himself to the case of idiots, arguing 
that is unnecessary, fran the perspective of 
rational egoism, to accord equal treatment to 
all idiots in order to guarantee protection 
for oneself in the event that one became an 
idiot. All that would be necessary is to 
guarantee continued equal treatment of all 
those who became idiots. This leaves the 
door open to abuse of congenital (adult) 
idiots, since such abuse would in no way 
violate the rational egoists' self-interest. 
Nor will "sentimental interest," as already 
pointed out, guarantee equal treabnent of 
congenital idiots, since many of them are not 
the objects of such interest. 
Jamieson criticizes this second argument 
on the grounds that a rational egoist could 
respond that the "epistennlogical problems" 
involved in detennining who is the object of 
sentimental interest are so severe that all 
idiots should be included in the "ambit of 
I!Orality. " Quite apart fran the question as 
to whether "sentimental interest" is a fonn 
of self-interest, this seems to me an ex­
tremely quibbling, if not patently false, 
objection to Regan's argument. 
Nor are Jamieson's own arguments any 
stronger. He asserts that the concept of 
egoistic self-interest is fluid, and that we, 
consequently, might cane to the view that 
idiots are "obscene I!Oral failures" who 
should be exterminated. Jamieson's position 
is that such an alteration in a rational 
egoist's concept of his/her own self-interest 
would result in his/her fonner self-interest 
in favor of idiots being treated fairly being 
outweighed, and that the abuse of idiots 
would then be mandated by self-interest. It 
is extremely unclear, however, in what sense 
the extermination of idiots would serve one's 
self-interests. In what way would the mere 
existence of idiots who are seen as "obscene 
I!Oral failures" involve a reduction in a 
rational egoist's self-interests? 
Jamieson also hyp:>thesizes that a popu­
lation explosion could result in a view of 
hmnan fetuses as a threat to survival and as, 
therefore, contrary to one's self-interests. 
Were this to happen, we might resort to can­
nibalism for the sake of our self-interest. 
Anything, of course, is possible, but these 
"fables, " as Jamieson rightly calls them, 
bear I!Ore resemblance to the idle and rather 
paranoid speculations which underlie the 
dcmino theory in politics than to a cogent 
retort to rational egoism. 
If it could be conclusively proven that 
it is not in the self-interest of rational 
egoists to treat children and I!Orons as 
though they had rights, this would, of 
course, force Narveson to accolUlt for how we 
can justify equal treatment in their case and 
not in the case of non-htnnan animals. Such a 
justification, I believe, could not be pro­
vided. Narveson would then be forced (assum­
ing that he would not simply adhere dogmatic­
ally to an inconsistent position) either to 
becane a p.tre rational egoist who would deny 
equal treabnent to children and idiots or. to 
extend equal treatment to non-htnnan animals 
as well. But in the latter case, the doc­
trine of rational egoism will have canpletely 
collapsed as an effective guide to "l!Oral n 
conduct. In so far as Regan's and Jamieson"s 
articles push Narveson toward this Itrlloso­
phical dilenroa, they are valuable and worthy 
of philosoItrlcal attention. 
As a defense of animals, however, both 
articles suffer fran very severe defects. I.n 
(oont. p. 25) 
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the first place, they are effective only to 
the extent that Narveson is inconsistent in 
his reasoning, i.e., is not a pure rational 
egoist. To a pure rational egoist, both 
Regan's and Jamieson's criticisms are com­
pletely irrelevant. 
Even granted that Narveson is inconsis­
tent, Regan's and Jamieson"s arguments are 
seriously deficient in other respects. Not 
only do they both ignore many of the weak­
nesses in Narveson's argument for equal 
treatment of children and idiots which I have 
pointed out above, but their own arguments 
(particularly Jamieson's) do not convincingly 
establish that it is not in a rational ego­
ist's self-interest to treat children and 
idiots equally. 
More importantly, the very nature of 
their approach to the problem leaves open the 
possibility of justifying the continued abuse 
of non-human animals. By accepting the issue 
on Narveson' s own terms, Regan and Jamieson 
grant him the opportunity of trying to pro­
duce rrore convincing arguments fran self­
interest for the equal treatment of children 
and idiots. Were he successful in doing 
this, then the continued abuse of non-human 
animals, which does not compranise our self­
interest, would be justified. For in this 
case, there would be no contradiction of the 
principle of rational egoism in treating 
children and idiots--but not non-human ani­
mals-as though they had rights. Whether 
this can be done is highly questionable. The 
point, however, is that in leaving open this 
possibility, Regan's and Jamieson's arguments 
are defective in principle. 
Finally, these arguments are objection­
able because they are iiJ.corrigibly species­
ist. This is due, once again, to the fact 
that both Regan and JamieSon accept. the pro­
blem on Narveson's own terms. Both priloso­
filers argue, in effect, that it is wrong to 
abuse animals because it leads to unjustified 
abuse of human beings. [5] 
iii 
What fonn, then, would effective rebut­
tal to Narveson's position take? Narveson's 
attempt to refute the "argument fran marginal 
cases" reveals that he shares singer's and 
Regan's concern lest children and idiots be 
abused, a concern which is rooted in rroral 
assumptions which he supposedly rejects and 
which are inconsistent with a pure rational 
egoism. In order to avoid the charge of a 
further inconsistency, i.e., the granting of 
equal treatment to "rightless" humans but not 
to "rightless" non-human animals, he defends 
such treatment on the grounds of rational 
self-interest. Yet, his rrotivation, as 
have tried to make clear, is not to avoid 
compranising human self-interest by treating 
children and idiots differently, but to en­
sure their equal treatment without at the 
same time compranising the principle of ra­
tional egoism. Nlarveson is inconsistent in" 
attempting to prevent the abuse of children 
and idiots for non-rationally egoistic rea­
sons, but consistent in utilizing rationally 
egoistic arguments to prevent such abuse. 
His concern for children and idiots, 
however, arrounts to an acknowledgement of the 
validity of the principle of. equality with 
regard to the treatment of human beings. 
Consequently, he is open to the charge of 
unjustified preferential treatment of human 
beings in spite of the fact that he uses 
arguments from self-interest to support it. 
Egoistic self-interest is not the true ground 
for preferential treatment of "rightless" 
humans. This is the major weakness in Narve­
son's argument, which both Regan and Jamieson 
ignore. Narveson is obliged either to become 
a pure rational egoist, for whom equal treat­
ment of children and idiots is a concern only 
insofar as it furthers his self-interests, or 
to explain why the principle of equality, 
which is applied to "rightless" humans, is 
not also applied to non-human animals. 
iv 
A profOlmder lesson, however, emerges 
from the consideration of these essays, name­
ly, a recognition of the dangers to which 
liberation rrovements are subject when their 
ideological foundations become the topic of 
intellectual and scholarly debate within the 
academic cammmity. Aziimal rights advocates 
may rightly applaud the increasing interest 
of the academic world in the prilosoprical 
issues raised by animal rights, but they 
should never forget that in terms of the goal 
which they espouse--the alleviation of animal 
suffering-such interest is justified only to 
the extent that it contributes to enlightened. 
attitooes toward non-human animals and effec­
tive political action on their behalf. This 
is not to say, of course, that they should 
simply ignore or reject prilosoprical argu­
roonts which run counter to the interests of 
non-human animals, nor that they should un­
25 BE'IWEEN THE SPOCIES 
=itically accept arguments which sUpp:Jrt 
animal rights. But it is essential that they 
learn to recognize their enemies. There is 
sanething lTDrally abominable about the "ob­
jective" debates on lTDral issues which often 
take place in a university context, when a 
propelling sense of lTDral outrage is altoge­
ther lacking. A controlled sense of lTDral 
outrage is the absolutely indispensable pre­
requisite for keeping one's true lTDral goals 
in view; it is not equivalent to naive or 
dogmatic eITDtional fervor or fanaticism. 
Where this lTDral outrage is lacking, 
there is a serious danger of gratuitous, 
destructive scepticism which is often justi­
fied on the grounds of intellectual curiosi­
ty, but which aITDunts to nothing lTDre than 
lTDral capriciousness and intellectual clever­
ness. To such scepticism the same objection 
can be made as is rightly made to animal 
experimenters who justify the torture of 
animals on the grounds that it extends the 
sfhere of human knowledge, even where such 
knowledge has no relevance whatsoever to the 
alleviation of suffering. This objection is 
that compassion must always preempt curiosi­
ty. The extension of human knowledge, where 
no reduction of suffering results, may be a 
good (although I am inclined to think it 
ranks very low on the scale of goods) , but 
knowledge gained at the expense of the in­
fliction of suffering is, to my mind, quite 
clearly an evil. 
None of this is to be construed as a 
denial of the urgent necessity of providing a 
finn, theoretical foundation for the animal 
rights nnvement. The attempt to do so neces­
sarily involves an unbiased and rigorous 
critical assessment not only of opposing 
arguments, but also of those which favor 
animal rights. Nor should we dogmatically 
assume that opp:Jsing arguments or =itiques 
of pro-animal rights arguments are lTDtivated 
by speciesism. A fhilosofher who is impelled 
by lTDral concern for non-human animals may 
render a valuable service by exposing weak­
nesses in arguments which are uncritically 
accepted. In a world, however, in which 
millions of non-human animals die annually in 
factory fanns and experimental laboratories 
in the U.S. alone, it is lTDrally repugnant to 
see fhilosofhers engaging in gratuitous de­
bates on highly technical and pragmatically 
irrelevant aspects of the lTDral issue of 
animal rights, or sowing the seeds of doubt 
concerning the justifiability of human treat­
ment of non-human animals for no other reason 
than idle curiosity. Such scholarly efforts 
serve only to drain liberation nnvements of 
their life-blood, and if not actually imnor­
aI, are at least utterly devoid of all re­
deeming lTDral conviction. 
'!here may, however, be another lTDtiva­
tion for such efforts. A fundamental error 
which often lies at the root of such efforts 
is the belief that all legitimate lTDral con­
victions are susceptible of absolute rational 
justification and that without such justifi­
cation they are worthless. I am convinced, 
on the contrary, that there are fundamental 
lTDral intuitions which cannot be intellec­
tually validated in a definitive way. When 
we become obsessed with intellectual "proofs" 
of lTDral p:Jsitions, we are in danger of be­
coming deaf to the unequivocal outcry of 
lTDral outrage and the testiITDny of our unam­
biguous lTDral intuitions. 
Such intuitions and outrage, of course,. 
must always be brought before the court of 
reason, and where reason judges sane incoher­
ent "'r clearly false, they should be rejec­
ted. But the incap:icity of reason to prove a 
p:Jsition does not prove it wrong. [6] 
The dangers outlined above are lurking 
in the articles discussed here, p:irticularly 
in those of Narveson and Jamieson. Let us 
recall Narveson's justification for develop­
ing his theory of "rational egoism." He does 
so, he says, not "because I am convinced that 
Singer et. ale are wrong. I hope it is 
because I am not convinced that they are 
right." This looks suspiciously like a ccm­
bination of the intellectual curiosity and 
BElWEEN THE SPECIES 26 
----
unbridled faith in reason criticized above. 
For it is clear fran his article that Narve­
son has a great deal of sympathy for non­
human animals. His sumnary of the "Regan­
Singer !=Osition" reads m:>re like a sympathe­
tic endorsement of that !=Osition--at least 
with regard to the factual abuses perpetrated 
on non-human animals--than a neutral, objec­
tive des=iption of it. This is sup!=Orted by 
other canments scattered throughout the arti­
cle, e.g., the rejection of the argument that 
factory faun animals are better off for hav­
ing been granted the chance to exist, the 
reference to rational egoism as a "nasty 
doctrine," and so forth. 
Assuming such a concern on Narveson's 
part, one might well ask why, if he is simply 
troubled by the ultimate cogency of Singer's 
and Regan's !=Osition, he does not address 
himself to exposing the weaknesses he finds 
in it. Rather than this, he develops the 
"nasty doctrine" of rational egoism, a doc­
trine which, as we have seen, he cannot bring 
himself to endorse whole-heartedly. How 
could the developnent of a theory which to­
tally excludes non-htnnan animals fran IlOral 
consideration !=Ossibly be construed as an 
effective means of resolving his lingering 
doubts concerning the plausibility of Sing­
erGs and Regan's !=Osition? It would seem, on 
·the contrary, to be a gratuitous exercise in 
destructive scepticism, which in no way ser­
ves the interest which (I hope) Narveson 
shares with Singer and Regan. 1. would sug­
gest that the IlOtivation for such an under­
taking may well have been the intellectual 
curiosity and unbridled faith in reason dis­
cussed above. 
Jamieson. (and to a much less degree, 
Regan) sucCLUTIb in their articles to the same 
m:>rally counter-productive temptations. This 
is evident fran the fact that they accept 
Narveson's forrm.l1ation of the problem as the 
starting !=Oint of their criticism. As a 
consequence, they argue their cases in a 
thoroughly speciesist way and canpletely 
ignore the principal flaw in Narveson's argu­
ment, the exposure of which would be the 
primary means of protecting the rights of 
animals. Thus, when Jamieson concludes his 
essay by saying that "because it is a bad 
m:>ral theory, rational egoism fails to pro­
vide a solid basis for a principled indiffer­
ence to the sufferings of aninals," he is 
certainly correct, but not at all in the way 
that he imagines. Rational egoism is a "bad 
m:>ral theory," not because the equal treat­
ment of children and idiots cannot be guaran­
teed by considerations of egoistic self­
interest, but because the exclusion of non­
htnnan animals from ethical consideration is a 
m:>ral outrage, which is totally unjustified 
if one accepts what I take to be a self­
evident m:>ral principle, namely, that the 
deliberate infliction of evil is always m:>r­
ally wrong. 
Notes 
1. Canadian Journal of Philoso]ihy 7 
(1977), pp. 161-78. 
2. Ibid., pp. 179-86. 
3. Environmental Ethics, 3 (1981), pp. 
167-71. 
4. A small !=Ortion of the present paper 
appeared in slightly different form as a 
review of Dale Jamieson's article in Ethics &
Animals 2 (1981). 
5. I am well aware, of course, that 
this is not representative of Regan's true 
!=Osition, nor, I suspect, of Jamieson's, but 
their arguments in these articles are thor­
oughly speciesist, nonetheless. 
6. I would argue that the opposite is 
also true: the incapacity of reason to dis­
prove a !=Osition does not prove it right.-­
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